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ABSTRACT 
 
Market Perceptions of Efficiency and News in Analyst Forecast Errors. (August 2003) 
 
Gia Marie Chevis, B.B.A., Texas A&M University 
 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:   Dr. Lynn Rees  
      Dr. K. Sivaramakrishnan 
 
 
Financial analysts are considered inefficient when they do not fully incorporate 
relevant information into their forecasts.  In this dissertation, I investigate differences in 
the observable efficiency of analysts’ earnings forecasts between firms that consistently 
meet or exceed analysts’ earnings expectations and those that do not.  I then analyze the 
extent to which the market incorporates this (in)efficiency into its earnings expectations.  
Consistent with my hypotheses, I find that analysts are relatively less efficient with 
respect to prior returns for firms that do not consistently meet expectations than for firms 
that do follow such a strategy, especially when prior returns convey bad news.  
However, forecast errors for firms that consistently meet expectations do not appear to 
be serially correlated to a greater extent than those for firms that do not consistently meet 
expectations.  It is not clear whether the market considers such inefficiency when setting 
its own expectations.  While the evidence suggests they may do so in the context of a 
shorter historical pattern of realized forecast errors, other evidence suggests they may 
not distinguish between predictable and surprise components of forecast error when the 
historical forecast error pattern is more established. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
[T]he earnings game does actual harm.  It distorts corporate decision making.  It 
reduces securities analysis and investing to a guessing contest.  It compromises 
the integrity of corporate audits.  Ultimately, it undermines the capital markets.   
-Collingwood (2001) 
 
Financial analysts’ forecasts are an important earnings target for firms and 
consequently are a focus of time and attention for market participants.  Managers have a 
variety of incentives to meet or exceed these expectations.  At the same time, investors 
have an incentive to improve upon analysts’ forecasts by incurring additional 
information search costs if they believe that the forecasts are not fully informative.  For 
example, analysts are considered inefficient when they do not fully incorporate relevant 
information into their forecasts; that is, they are inefficient when they do not get to the 
“right” prediction because they systematically do not search for or use relevant 
information “enough” and/or use any information gathered incorrectly.1  Prior empirical 
work has found evidence consistent with analyst inefficiency.  Investors may, however, 
rely more on forecasts that appear more efficient.   
In this paper, I investigate whether a firm’s strategy of consistently meeting or 
exceeding expectations influences observable forecast efficiency.  Such a strategy may  
reduce the variability in ex-post forecast errors and so may make analysts’ forecasts 
appear efficient, regardless of the actual behavior of analysts.  I then analyze the extent 
to which the market incorporates this (in)efficiency into its earnings expectation by 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Accounting and Economics. 
 
1 Givoly (1985) cites Muth’s (1961) criterion for rationality, namely that for a forecast to be rational its 
formation must follow the same stochastic process that generates the forecasted variable.  He states, 
however, that most tests of this tenet are much narrower in scope, that they are tests for unbiasedness and 
efficiency.  I discuss this definition of efficiency in further detail in Section 2. 
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examining whether the resultant forecast predictability affects the market’s reaction to 
the announcement of realized earnings.  To the extent that analyst forecasts are naively 
incorporated into market expectations, inefficient forecasts contribute to market 
inefficiencies. 
Addressing these issues will increase our understanding of how earnings games 
affect market participants’ abilities to evaluate firm performance.   Managers play an 
“earnings game” when they focus on the quarterly earnings number (and its relation to 
the consensus forecast) to the exclusion of nearly all else (Collingwood [2001]).  Critics 
cite these games as causes for concern, diverting managers’ time from real, productive 
effort and concentrating their efforts on meeting a short-run, benchmark figure.   Recent 
events, such as the scandals with analysts at investment banks, underscore the 
importance of understanding how and to what extent analysts’ and investors’ 
misinterpretation of earnings strategies contributes to a harmful playing field for market 
participants.  Additionally, addressing these questions may help identify the situations in 
which market participants are the most disadvantaged and inform debate as to what 
institutional remedies may be required. 
Indeed, government regulators have recently turned their attention to this issue.  
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan points out that the current environment of 
rapid change makes long-term forecasting riskier and, consequently, has led to a focus 
on short-term earnings when assessing the investment value of equity securities.  This 
short-term focus has, in turn, shifted CEO attention to “accounting devices” useful in 
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meeting that target,2 compromising the transparency and comparability of reported 
accounting numbers (Levitt [1998]).   The United States Congress’ recent passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is coincident with President Bush’s condemnation of both 
“deception accounting” and analysts’ positions as “salesmen with a hidden agenda.”3 
While critics believe the managerial focus on quarterly earnings forecasts to be 
inappropriate, to date little systematic work assesses the implications of consistently 
meeting or exceeding analyst forecasts.   
Existing papers concentrate either on the characteristics of firms that meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts (Chevis, Das, and Sivaramakrishnan [2002a]; Matsumoto [2002]) or 
on the rewards to such behavior (Lopez and Rees [2002]; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 
[2002]; Kasznik and McNichols [2002]; Chevis, Das, and Sivaramakrishnan [2002b]).  
My paper contributes to this literature by investigating differences in the observability of 
analyst forecast efficiency within the context of the meet-or-beat strategy and whether 
these differences influence the market’s perception of news in the forecast error.  It is a 
step toward understanding the impact on the market of firms consistently meeting or 
exceeding analysts’ forecasts of quarterly earnings, rather than an investigation of the 
strategy per se.   
In the first part of the analysis, I model forecast errors as a function of publicly-
available information, proxied by prior returns and forecast errors, similar to Elgers and 
Lo (1994).  I compare the resulting slope estimates for firms that consistently meet or 
exceed analyst expectations to those that do not in order to examine the effects of such 
                                                 
2 Remarks at the Stern School of Business, New York University, March 26, 2002. 
3 Speech in New York, July 9, 2002. 
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behavior on observable analyst forecast efficiency.  In the second part, I investigate the 
relation between this (in)efficiency and the market’s response to realized earnings.  In 
particular, I calculate the residual forecast error after controlling for analyst inefficiency 
and examine the differences in earnings response coefficients for the residual and 
predictable components of error.   
Consistent with my hypotheses, I find that analysts appear relatively inefficient 
with respect to prior returns for firms that do not consistently follow a strategy of 
meeting or exceeding analyst earnings forecasts, especially when those returns convey 
bad news.     However, analysts appear relatively inefficient with respect to the 
information in prior period forecast errors for firms that do consistently meet or beat 
expectations.  It is not clear whether the market is able to discern this inefficiency, 
however.  While the evidence suggests they may do so in the context of a shorter 
historical pattern of realized forecast errors, other evidence suggests they may not 
distinguish between predictable and surprise components of forecast error when the 
historical forecast error pattern is more established. 
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EFFICIENCY OF ANALYST EARNINGS FORECASTS CONDITIONAL ON AN 
EARNINGS STRATEGY 
Introduction 
 As indicated above, analysts are inefficient when they do not fully incorporate 
relevant information into their forecasts (Givoly [1985]); that is, analysts do not get to 
the “right” prediction because they systematically do not search for or use relevant 
information “enough” and/or use any information gathered incorrectly.   
Several studies examine analyst forecast efficiency by using various proxies for 
“relevant information.” Though forecast revisions are positively associated with 
contemporaneous returns (Imhoff and Lobo [1984]), analysts still do not incorporate all 
of the information available in prices (Lys and Sohn [1990]; Abarbanell [1991]).  
Consistent with these results, Elgers and Lo (1994) find that using information from 
prior period returns and earnings to adjust current period analyst forecasts can 
substantially improve forecast accuracy.  Several other studies find that time-series-
based and analyst-based earnings forecasts are complementary; a more accurate forecast 
can be created by using elements of both (Conroy and Harris [1987]; Lobo and Nair 
[1991]; Elgers and Murray [1992]).   
These studies suggest that analysts are to some degree inefficient in their forecast 
formation.  Using these prior works as a starting point, I first describe the relation 
between forecast errors and certain information variables.  I then describe how a firm’s 
use of a strategy of consistently meeting or exceeding expectations can affect these 
relations. 
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Efficiency and returns 
Consistent with the above papers, and assuming returns during the period reflect, 
at least in part, information relevant for earnings reported at the end of the period, I 
expect to observe a relationship between realized forecast errors and contemporaneous 
returns if analysts are inefficient.    
FEit = α + βRit + εit        (1) 
where 
FEit = realized forecast error for firm i period t,  defined as actual less forecasted 
earnings, deflated by price measured two days after the earnings 
announcement for period t-1, 
Rit = return for firm i period t, measured from two days after the earnings 
announcement for period t-1 through the day prior to the forecast date, and 
εit = residual term. 
 
 
In this model, the intercept estimate α includes any forecast bias, while the slope 
estimate β is a measure of the degree of forecast inefficiency relative to the return 
variable.  That is, since β is the correlation between returns and realized forecast error, it 
is a measure of the extent to which the information in returns is not reflected in forecasts.  
If forecasts correctly incorporated all of the information in returns, there would be no 
systematic relation between that information and the extent to which analysts were 
wrong (i.e. forecast errors would be a random shock).   
It is not immediately clear whether any observable correlation would be positive 
or negative, however.  Overreaction to information is indicative of an over-extrapolation 
of current results into the future.  If analysts tend to overreact to information, as 
DeBondt and Thaler (1990) suggest, then in periods of good (bad) news they will tend to 
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post forecasts of earnings that turn out to be too high (low).  The observed forecast error 
will then be optimistic (pessimistic), and the correlation between forecast errors and pre-
earnings announcement returns will be negative, e.g. the pre-earnings announcement 
information is positive but the forecast error is negative.4  Conversely, underreaction 
implies that the full import of current results for the future is not understood.  If analysts 
tend to underreact to information, as Mendenhall (1991) and Abarbanell and Bernard 
(1992) suggest, the reverse argument will hold.  That is, in periods of good (bad) news 
their earnings estimates will be too low (high), resulting in an observed pessimistic 
(optimistic) forecast error and a positive correlation between errors and returns.  Figure 1 
below illustrates these relationships. 
Of course, analysts may not react the same way to both good and bad news.  If 
they overreact to good news but underreact to bad news, as in Easterwood and Nutt 
(1999), then the correlation between errors and returns will be negative when the return 
is negative but positive when the return is positive.  If they underreact to good news and 
overreact to bad news, the reverse will hold.  To accommodate this possibility, I 
calculate individual intercepts and slopes for negative and nonnegative return firms.5   
FEit = α1UPit + α2DNit + β1Rit*UPit + β2Rit*DNit  + εit   (2) 
 where 
UP=1 if Rit≥0 and 0 otherwise, and 
DN=1 if Rit<0 and 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
4 To find a correlation, the information and the errors must be related in magnitude and not just sign.  For 
example, if analysts overreact to high good news, the resulting error should be larger than if they overreact 
to low good news.  To the extent that this extrapolation is non-constant, it biases against finding results. 
5 This specification is equivalent to stacking separate regressions of equation (1) for good news and bad 
news firms. 
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 Good News Bad News 
Overreaction 
 
R > 0 
F too high 
A - F < 0 
ρ < 0 
 
R < 0 
F too low 
A - F > 0 
ρ < 0 
Underreaction 
 
R > 0 
F too low 
A - F > 0 
ρ > 0 
 
R < 0 
F too high 
A - F < 0 
ρ > 0 
 
Notes: 
Variable definitions: 
A Actual earnings for firm i, period t  
F Forecasted earnings for firm i, period t  
R Return for firm i, period t, measured from t-1 
earnings announcement through the forecast  
 
Figure 1 
Interpretation of β1 and β2 signs 
 
 
 Again, the coefficients α1 and α2 encompass any forecast bias for firms with good 
and bad news during the period, respectively.  The slope coefficients indicate the extent 
of analyst under/overreaction to the information in returns.  Specifically, β1 is the 
relationship between forecast errors and returns for positive return firms, while β2 is the 
relationship for negative return firms.  Given the conflicting evidence of prior papers, I 
do not make predictions about the signs of the estimated coefficients. 
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Efficiency and past errors 
 In addition to the news reflected in current period returns, analysts should take 
forecast error history into account when forming their expectations for the current 
period’s earnings (Givoly 1985).6  As with the returns-based information, if analysts are 
efficient with respect to their prior forecast errors, then there should be no correlation 
between errors in successive periods; there should be neither a persistent error (positive 
serial correlation) nor a predictable switch between over and underestimation of earnings 
(negative serial correlation).  Including this information, the model becomes: 
FEit = α1UPit + α2DNit + β1Rit*UPit + β2Rit*DNit + β3FEit-1 + εit  (3) 
Brown and Rozeff (1979) find that analysts appear to adaptively correct their 
future earnings expectations; that is, they raise (lower) their consensus forecast of 
subsequent earnings when they’ve underestimated (overestimated) earnings for the 
current period.    This is consistent with the null hypothesis of β3 = 0; since analysts 
learn from past mistakes, consecutive forecasts are not systematically related.  Ali, 
Klein, and Rosenfeld (1992), however, find that consensus forecast errors are positively 
serially correlated when firms have more permanent earnings, suggesting that in at least 
some cases such adaptive corrections are not complete, consistent with a finding of β3 > 
0.   Additionally, if firms consistently meet or exceed expectations, forecast errors 
should be positively serially correlated.7 
                                                 
6 Givoly (1985) specifically refers to individual analysts.  I use consensus forecasts, but the same logic still 
applies.  That is, if each analyst that forms the consensus takes their own forecast error history into 
account, the consensus, too, should reflect that efficiency. 
7 For example, a firm that consistently exceeds expectations by a penny would have perfect serial 
correlation in forecast errors (β3 = 1). 
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The effect of an earnings strategy on observable analyst efficiency 
 Analysts, however, are not the only market participants that affect the magnitude 
and sign of the realized forecast error.  Managers ultimately post the earnings realization, 
and two methods are available to them in their pursuit of the forecast: expectations 
management and earnings management.  The former requires managers to guide analyst 
forecasts toward a more preferable target.  The latter requires managers to use available 
flexibility in discretionary accruals.   
Despite their shortcomings, forecasts remain an important performance hurdle 
for firms.  Several studies document that a firm receives a reward when it meets or 
exceeds expectations, over both a short (Kasznik and McNichols [2002]; Lopez and 
Rees [2002]; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn [2002]) and long window (Chevis, Das, and 
Sivaramakrishnan [2002b]).  Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that some firms face an 
asymmetric return structure to realized forecast errors;8 though small positive errors 
generate small positive reactions, small negative errors generate much larger negative 
reactions.  Additionally, empirical evidence exists showing that the market regards 
analyst forecasts as possessing information content.  For example, Cornell and 
Landsman (1989) show that at the time of a quarterly earnings announcement, the 
market not only reacts to this period’s earnings information but also to the revision by 
analysts of their forecasts for the following period. 
                                                 
8 Skinner and Sloan (1999) focus specifically on growth firms, but it seems reasonable, especially given 
the press attention to quarterly earnings announcements, that non-growth firms would face the same 
asymmetric reward structure.  Lopez and Rees (2002) report results consistent with this notion for their 
full sample of firms, which includes growth and nongrowth firms. 
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All managers, even those with bad news (negative returns) during the period or 
forecasted losses, can have an incentive to meet or exceed earnings forecasts9.  They 
may attempt to do so throughout the period through expectations management and, if 
still necessary, at the end of the period through earnings management10.  There is no 
need to consistently generate extreme positive errors, however.  Exactly meeting or 
exceeding expectations by only a small amount allows the firm to meet the earnings 
target but it neither “wastes” credibility or slack in accruals which may be needed for 
future periods nor encourages the next quarter’s forecast to start out too high.   
These incentives may combine to restrict the observed variability in forecast 
errors for firms that consistently meet or exceed expectations (MEET firms).  As a result, 
the observed correlation between forecast errors and contemporaneous returns may be 
weakened for MEET firms, regardless of the actual level of analyst efficiency.  That is, 
analysts of firms that consistently meet or beat forecasts appear more efficient with 
respect to returns information, while the real reason for the lack of observable 
correlation may be the strategizing efforts of management.  For firms that do not 
(successfully) follow such a strategy, the market can better observe the actual efficiency 
of analysts with respect to returns.  MEET firms may, however, still have a stronger 
                                                 
9 To my knowledge, there is no research on whether target preferences are different for positive and 
negative return firms.  Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) imply that there is an order to the 
preference: first, positive income; second, positive change in income; third, positive forecast error. Other 
work has used this notion; for example, Brown (1998) maintains that firms are of the “miss by an inch, 
miss by a mile” mindset, i.e. that firms which are going to post losses do not have a motivation to beat 
expectations.  Given the potential for managers to manage expectations, as well as earnings, I do not 
believe the hierarchy necessarily holds; it does not speak to the question of whether managers’ incentives 
to consistently meet or exceed expectations are different for profit and loss firms. 
10 This refers to an order of actions, not a preference for a particular action.  For example, evidence in 
Chevis, Das, and Sivaramakrishnan (2002b) suggests that earnings management is employed more 
frequently than expectations management in order to consistently meet or exceed expectations. 
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positive serial correlation in the observed forecast errors than firms that do not 
consistently meet or beat expectations (NONMEET firms).  While MEET firms may 
appear ex-post to be relatively more efficient with respect to current period information 
(returns), they may appear to be relatively less efficient with respect to prior period 
forecast errors.  The resulting hypotheses follow:   
NONMEETMEET
NONMEETMEET
NONMEETMEET
H
BH
AH
,3,3
,2,2
,1,1
:2
:1
:1
ββ
ββ
ββ
=
<
<
 
Data sources and variable measurement 
I obtain information on analyst forecasts and actual earnings from the I/B/E/S 
Detail File from the first quarter of 1996 through the first quarter of 2001.   The detail, 
rather than the summary, file is used in order to obtain a cleaner window11 over which to 
estimate the return-information proxy.  Additionally, it allows more control over the 
staleness of the forecasts included in the consensus estimate.  Analyst forecast error (FE) 
is calculated as actual less forecasted earnings per share, deflated by the price at the 
beginning of the return accumulation window (i.e. two days after the t-1 earnings 
announcement).  Both a consensus and the single-most-recent forecast are used in the 
tests.  A consensus forecast better represents an earnings target as it is the one typically 
reported in the popular press.  The recency of the single most recent forecast (relative to 
the earnings announcement), however, gives analysts their best chance to incorporate all 
relevant information.   The consensus forecast value is measured as the median of the 
                                                 
11 An alternative source of consensus forecast information is the IBES Consensus tape.  For these 
consensus estimates, it is difficult to ascertain the date of the earliest individual forecast contained in the 
consensus estimate.   
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forecasts made within the sixty day period prior to the earnings announcement, while the 
single most recent forecast is the last available forecast in that same period.  Actual 
earnings are also obtained from I/B/E/S to improve the alignment between actual and 
forecasted earnings.   
Return information is obtained from the CRSP tapes.  Information-proxy returns 
(Rit) are market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (raw return less the value-
weighted market return).   Because the information must be available prior to the 
forecast, these pre-announcement window returns are measured from two days after the 
previous quarter’s earnings announcement through the date of the first forecast used in 
calculating the consensus (single most recent forecast). 
Similar to Chevis, Das, and Sivaramakrishnan (2002b), I classify firms according 
to how many times they meet or exceed expectations during the horizon.  MEET firms 
are those which meet or exceed analyst expectations in each of the eight prior quarters, 
up to and including the current quarter; these firms have demonstrated a strategy of 
consistently meeting or exceeding expectations.  A NONMEET firm is one in which 
forecasts were met or exceeded no more than half the time (i.e. in fewer than five of the 
eight quarters); these firms do not appear to have such a strategy, and may, in fact, have 
a pattern of consistently missing analyst expectations.  Additionally, a screen is run to 
ensure any quarters in which a NONMEET firms meets or exceeds expectations are not 
concentrated in the latter half of the horizon window, as this may indicate a change in 
strategy.  Firms which are not classified as MEET or NONMEET are not included in the 
analysis.    This two-year measurement window represents a compromise between 
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evidence of an established strategy and sample size considerations.  As a sensitivity 
check, however, tests are replicated using both four- and twelve-quarter horizons.  
Similar to the eight-quarter horizon, firms are classified as MEET if they meet or exceed 
analyst expectations in each of the four (twelve) prior quarters, including the current 
quarter, and are classified as NONMEET if they meet or exceed expectations in two 
(six) or fewer quarters. 
Several steps are taken to eliminate data errors and reduce the effect of outliers.  
First, to eliminate data errors, I eliminate firm quarters in which raw returns are less than 
-1.   Next, to reduce the effect of outliers, I delete a firm-quarter if its beginning of 
period stock price is less than $3 per share in order to alleviate the unique effects of 
small-cap stocks.  Then, I delete observations in which the absolute forecast error is in 
excess of 100% of the beginning of period stock price.  Finally, I delete observations 
within each regression estimation with a studentized residual in excess of 3 in absolute 
value.   
I estimate equation 3 two ways.  First, I estimate equation 3 quarterly for each 
group separately (i.e. twenty-one quarterly estimations for MEET firms and twenty-one 
quarterly estimations for NONMEET firms).  I then perform T-tests of the mean 
difference in absolute value of the coefficient estimates for each quarter.  That is, I 
calculate NONMEETQMEETQDIFF ,, ˆˆ ββ −=  and perform a T-test of H0: DIFF=0 to 
determine if there is a significant difference within each quarter, on average, in the 
magnitude of the MEET and NONMEET coefficient estimates.  Next, I  estimate 
equation 3 jointly for the MEET and NONMEET groups by interacting each term with a 
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dummy variable for MEET and NONMEET and running the resulting equation on the 
full sample.  I then perform F-tests to determine if NONMEETMEET ββ ˆˆ −  for a particular β 
estimate. 
Results 
Descriptive results for MEET and NONMEET groupings based on consensus 
forecast error are in Table 1.   Panel A reports means, medians, and T-tests of differences 
in means for the forecast error and return variables used in later analysis, as well as 
several additional contextual items.  On average, analysts slightly overestimate current 
period earnings for firms that do not have a pattern of consistently meeting or exceeding 
expectations (NONMEET firms) in the past.  By sample construction, analysts slightly 
underestimate current period earnings for MEET firms.  Though both MEET and 
NONMEET firms have approximately the same percentage of negative and nonnegative 
return observations,  the value of both negative and nonnegative returns for MEET firms 
are significantly larger than those of NONMEET firms, indicating MEET firms have a 
broader returns distribution.  MEET firms are, in general, larger and more profitable than 
NONMEET firms, though they do not appear to be any more highly levered.    The 
return measurement window is slightly longer for NONMEET firms, indicating the first 
forecast used in creating the consensus typically occurs later in the quarter relative to the 
previous earnings announcement date for these firms.  While the difference is 
significant, it is not large  (an average of approximately two days) and should not affect 
the regression analyses. 
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Panel B reports both Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for the main 
regression variables.  The univariate results are mixed for the hypothesis that analysts 
appear more efficient with respect to prior returns for MEET firms than for NONMEET 
firms (hypotheses 1a and 1b); current period forecast error is not consistently 
significantly correlated with prior returns for either group.  For hypothesis 2, however—
that forecast errors are more persistent for MEET firms than for NONMEET firms, the 
evidence is more clear.  Both the Pearson and Spearman correlations between current 
and lagged forecast error appear to be larger for MEET firms than for NONMEET firms. 
Table 2 presents the results of the quarterly analysis of equation (3) for all three 
horizons using consensus forecasts.  Turning to panel A, results for the eight quarter 
horizon, note that the significance of the average coefficient estimate on returns-based 
news depends upon the nature of the news.  The average coefficient for good news 
(positive returns) is marginally significantly greater than zero for MEET firms, 
suggesting that analysts may tend to underreact to good news in their forecasts of current 
period earnings if the firm has a past pattern of meeting or exceeding expectations.  A 
similar result can be found in panels B and C for the four and twelve quarter horizons, 
respectively.  These results are consistent with the earnings game notion that analysts 
have an incentive to “lowball” their forecasts and  “allow” firms to post a good news 
earnings surprise.  For NONMEET firms, it is the average coefficient estimate for bad 
news that is significantly greater than zero at the eight and four quarter horizons,  
17 
 
Table 1 
Univariate Statistics 
Eight-Quarter Horizon, Consensus Forecast 
 
Panel A:  Means and Medians 
Meana 
Median 
 
MEETb 
n=3,340 
NONMEET 
n=3,089 
 
t-statc 
 
FEitcons 
0.0009 
0.0003 
-0.0017 
-0.0002 7.64 
FEit-1cons. 
0.0009 
0.0003 
-0.0023 
 -0.0003 10.47 
UPit 
0.5066 
1 
0.4551 
0 n/a 
DNit 
0.4934 
0 
0.5449 
1 n/a 
UPit*Rit 
0.0546 
0.0000 
0.0451 
0.0000 3.78 
DNit*Rit 
-0.0546 
0.0000 
-0.0588 
-0.0152 1.89 
Salesit 
1,824 
531 
813 
304 13.64 
Compustat 
EPSit 
0.527 
0.450 
0.231 
0.280 7.01 
Assetsit 
18,274 
3,151 
7,032 
2,104 11.22 
Liabilitiesit 
15,181 
1,840 
5,442 
1,280 10.44 
Equityit 
3,092 
1,075 
1,590 
706 13.88 
Leverageit 
3.281 
1.393 
3.116 
1.711 0.42 
Return 
Window 
44.74 
42 
47.42 
46 -5.90 
Forecast 
Window 
42.51 
46 
39.72 
42 7.89 
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Table 1, Continued 
Panel B—Correlation Coefficients 
MEET      
  Pearson 
  FEit FEit-1 UPit*Rit DNit*Rit 
FEit 1.000 0.669*** 0.022 -0.044** 
FEit-1 0.520*** 1.000 0.033* -0.021 
UPit*Rit 0.041** 0.016 1.000 0.325*** 
Spearman 
DNit*Rit -0.003 -0.016 0.789*** 1.000 
      
NONMEET      
  Pearson 
  FEit FEit-1 UPit*Rit DNit*Rit 
FEit 1.000 0.138*** -0.010 0.025 
FEit-1 0.153*** 1.000 0.041** -0.007 
UPit*Rit 0.059*** 0.053*** 1.000 0.308*** 
Spearman 
DNit*Rit 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.771*** 1.000 
 
 Notes: 
aVariable definitions: 
FEitcons 
Forecast error for firm i period t,  defined as actual less forecasted earnings per share, 
deflated by beginning of period price.  The earnings forecast is calculated as the median of 
the most recent forecast for each analyst, available within the sixty-day period prior to the 
earnings announcement. 
Rit 
Compound return for firm i period t, measured from two days after the prior quarter’s 
earnings announcement through the day prior to the first forecast used to calculate the 
consensus earnings forecast, less the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio return. 
UPit 1 if Rit ≥ 0, 0 otherwise. 
DNit 1 if Rit < 0, 0 otherwise. 
Sales Net sales for the quarter (I2) 
EPSit Earnings per share for firm i period t, fully diluted and including extraordinary items (I7) 
Assets Total assets at the end of the quarter (I44) 
Liabilities Total liabilities at the end of the quarter (I54) 
Equity Total assets less total liabilities at the end of the quarter (I44-I54) 
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total equity at the end of the quarter 
Return 
Window Number of days over which Rit is measured 
Forecast 
Window Number of days over which the consensus forecast, FEit
cons, is calculated 
 
bFirms are categorized by how many times they meet within the most recent eight, four, and twelve 
quarters, including the current quarter.  NONMEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in no more than half of 
the quarters.  MEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in each of the quarters. The precise number of 
observations depends on data availability and varies by item. 
cT-statistics (difference in means test) are reported comparing the MEET and NONMEET subsamples.
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suggesting that analysts underreact to bad news when the firm has not consistently met 
or exceeded expectations in the past.  This result is consistent with prior findings of 
analyst optimism. 
T-tests of the mean difference in absolute coefficient estimates for β1 and β2 are 
consistent with hypotheses 1A and 1B, which posited that the magnitude of the 
relationship between news and forecast error  (i.e. the degree of analyst forecast 
inefficiency) would be greater, on average, for NONMEET firms than for MEET firms.  
For example, the estimate for β1 is, across quarters, not significant for NONMEET firms, 
implying that analysts do not consistently over or underestimate the impact of good news 
for current period earnings.  Within a quarter, however, the magnitude of analyst 
inefficiency is on average larger for NONMEET firms than for MEET firms.  Within a 
quarter, β2 is also larger in magnitude, on average, for NONMEET firms.  This result 
holds for each horizon. 
The average estimated coefficient on lagged forecast errors, β3, is significantly 
positive for both MEET and NONMEET firms, suggesting analysts consistently 
underreact to their prior period errors.  Consistent with hypothesis 2, the estimated 
magnitude of β3 is, on average, larger for MEET firms than for NONMEET firms at each 
horizon. 
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Table 2 
Quarterly Regression Results on Observable Analyst Efficiency Using Consensus 
Analyst Estimates of Earnings 
 
Regression Model: (Quarters 1996.1 through 2001.1)a 
FEit = α1UPit + α2DNit + β1Rit*UPit + β2Rit*DNit + β3FEit-1 + εit 
 
Panel A: Eight-quarter horizon 
 
 
MEETb,c NONMEET 
T-testd 
nonmeetmeet ββ =  
UP 0.0002 (5.55) 
-0.0003 
(-1.15) -3.48
*** 
DN 0.0003 (5.64) 
-0.0005 
(-2.04) -4.20
*** 
R*UP 0.0005 (1.73) 
-0.0023 
(-0.65) -2.70
** 
R*DN 0.0000 (0.10) 
0.0087 
(2.19) -3.70
*** 
FEt-1 
0.5546 
(12.69) 
0.2050 
(3.64) 4.53
*** 
 
Panel B: Four-quarter horizon 
 
 
MEET NONMEET 
T-test 
nonmeetmeet ββ =  
UP 0.0004 (10.44) 
-0.0010 
(-5.55) 4.61
*** 
DN 0.0005 (8.15) 
-0.0007 
(-2.76) 3.63
*** 
R*UP 0.0007 (3.00) 
0.0015 
(0.91) 4.24
*** 
R*DN 0.0000 (0.12) 
0.0072 
(3.63) 4.91
*** 
FEt-1 
0.4926 
(14.50) 
0.1668 
(2.49) 3.71
*** 
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Table 2, Continued 
Panel C: Twelve-quarter horizon 
 
 
MEET NONMEET 
T-test 
nonmeetmeet ββ =  
UP 0.0002 
(1.74) 
-0.0006 
(-1.76) 
3.76*** 
DN 0.0002 
(3.55) 
-0.0007 
(-1.59) 
3.82*** 
R*UP 0.0012 
(1.82) 
0.0000 
(0.04) 
4.01*** 
R*DN 0.0008 
(0.81) 
0.0080 
(1.35) 
3.44*** 
FEt-1 0.6279 
(5.13) 
0.1469 
(2.31) 
3.10*** 
 
  
Notes: 
aVariable definitions: 
FEit 
Forecast error for firm i period t,  defined as actual less forecasted earnings per share, 
deflated by beginning of period price.  The earnings forecast is calculated as the median 
of the most recent forecast for each analyst, available within the sixty-day period prior to 
the earnings announcement. 
Rit 
Return for firm i period t, measured from two days after the prior quarter’s earnings 
announcement through the day prior to the first forecast used to calculate the consensus 
earnings forecast, less the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio return. 
UPit 1 if Rit ≥ 0, 0 otherwise 
DNit 1 if Rit < 0, 0 otherwise. 
bFirms are categorized by how many times they meet within the most recent eight, four, and twelve 
quarters, including the current quarter.  NONMEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in no more than half of 
the quarters.  MEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in each of the quarters.   
c Coefficient are reported as the average estimate over 21 cross-sectional quarterly regressions performed 
for each group, MEET and NONMEET. 
dT-tests are reported evaluating the mean difference in absolute value of coefficients. 
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Results for estimation of equation 3 jointly for MEET and NONMEET firms are 
presented in Table 3.  These results are generally consistent with those found in Table 2, 
with the exception of the relationship between forecast errors and good news.  Here, 
analysts appear relatively efficient with respect to good news for both MEET and 
NONMEET firms, both across quarters within a group as well as across groups within a 
quarter.   
 
Table 3 
Pooled Regression Results on Observable Analyst Efficiency Using Consensus Analyst Estimates of 
Earnings 
 
Regression Model: (Quarters 1996.1 through 2001.1)a 
FEit = α1UPit + α2DNit + β1Rit*UPit + β2Rit*DNit + β3FEit-1 + εit 
 
Panel A: Eight-quarter horizon 
 
 
MEETb,c NONMEET 
F-testd 
nonmeetmeet ββ =  
UP 0.0002 
(1.10) 
-0.0005 
(-2.97) 
1.74 
DN 0.0001 
(0.72) 
-0.0004 
(-2.17) 
0.79 
R*UP 0.0002 
(0.22) 
-0.0000 
(-0.06) 
0.01 
R*DN -0.0008 
(-0.63) 
0.0077 
(6.75) 
16.30*** 
FEt-1 0.7744 
(22.21) 
0.0987 
(11.57) 
354.46*** 
 N=6,373 
Adj. R2 = 13.14% 
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Table 3, Continued 
Panel B: Four-quarter horizon 
 
MEET NONMEET 
F-test 
nonmeetmeet ββ =  
UP 0.0005 
(6.40) 
-0.0009 
(-8.94) 
7.26*** 
DN 0.0005 
(5.19) 
-0.0008 
(-7.35) 
3.88** 
R*UP 0.0006 
(1.33) 
0.0003 
(0.58) 
0.16 
R*DN -0.0011 
(-1.66) 
0.0068 
(9.80) 
37.74*** 
FEt-1 0.4729 
(31.15) 
0.1004 
(17.50) 
527.02*** 
 N=15,902 
Adj. R2 = 15.07% 
Panel C: Twelve-quarter horizon 
 
MEET NONMEET 
F-test 
nonmeetmeet ββ =  
UP 0.0000 
(0.01) 
-0.0011 
(-5.80) 
13.58*** 
DN 0.0000 
(0.10) 
-0.0009 
(-4.24) 
5.99*** 
R*UP 0.0014 
(0.84) 
0.0025 
(1.85) 
0.28 
R*DN 0.0000 
(0.02) 
0.0084 
(5.44) 
10.40*** 
FEt-1 0.8885 
(19.98) 
0.0642 
(9.05) 
334.93*** 
 N=3,148 
Adj. R2 = 19.32% 
  
Notes: 
aVariable definitions: 
FEit 
Forecast error for firm i period t,  defined as actual less forecasted earnings per share, 
deflated by beginning of period price.  The earnings forecast is calculated as the median 
of the most recent forecast for each analyst, available within the sixty-day period prior to 
the earnings announcement. 
Rit 
Return for firm i period t, measured from two days after the prior quarter’s earnings 
announcement through the day prior to the first forecast used to calculate the consensus 
earnings forecast, less the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio return. 
UPit 1 if Rit ≥ 0, 0 otherwise 
DNit 1 if Rit < 0, 0 otherwise. 
bFirms are categorized by how many times they meet within the most recent eight, four, and twelve 
quarters, including the current quarter.  NONMEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in no more than half of 
the quarters.  MEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in each of the quarters.   
c Coefficient estimates are reported for the regression estimated jointly for the MEET and NONMEET 
groups. 
dF-tests are reported comparing the absolute value of the coefficient estimates between MEET and 
NONMEET groups. 
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Recall that the single most recent forecast is more timely than the consensus 
forecast (though typically not quoted in the popular press when earnings are announced).  
Consequently, by the time of the single most recent forecast, analysts have had more 
time to properly evaluate and incorporate the information they have obtained.  
Additionally, managers have had more time over which to provide earnings guidance to 
analysts and potentially influence the “earnings hurdle” they face.  Tables 4 and 5 
present the quarterly and jointly estimated coefficients, respectively, for equation 3 using 
the single most recent analyst forecast available prior to the earnings announcement as 
the measure of expected earnings in calculating current and lagged forecast error as well 
as MEET or NONMEET status. 
Turning first to Table 4, containing coefficients estimated separately for each 
group and averaged across the twenty-one quarters, we see that the results are less clear.  
Consistent with the hypotheses, the T-tests of mean difference in absolute coefficient 
estimates at each horizon indicate that, within quarters, observable analyst inefficiency is 
on average greater for NONMEET firms than for MEET firms with respect to prior 
returns-based information but that forecast errors are more persistent for MEET firms.  
However, average coefficient estimates across quarters for a particular subgroup do not 
show a consistent pattern.  At the four and eight quarter horizons analysts continue to 
underestimate the effect of bad news for NONMEET firms; however this effect is no 
longer evident by the twelve quarter horizon.  Four quarter horizon results are consistent 
with the results obtained from Table 2; while the effects of bad news are underestimated 
for NONMEET firms, the effects of good news are underestimated for MEET firms.  
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However, at the longer horizons—when firms have consistently met or exceeded 
expectations for longer periods of time—current period forecasts appear efficient with 
respect to good news but appear to underestimate the effect of bad news.  This is 
inconsistent with the notion of managers successfully issuing negative guidance in order 
to lower earnings expectations and hence their earnings hurdle. 
However, results from Table 5 are consistent with results from Table 3.  When 
the coefficients are estimated jointly, analysts appear efficient with respect to all returns-
based news for MEET firms and relatively less efficient with respect to negative returns-
based news for NONMEET firms.  In addition, at the longer twelve-quarter horizon, 
analysts appear optimistic in general for NONMEET firms, overestimating the effect of 
good news and underestimating the effect of bad news for current period earnings. 
 
Table 4 
Quarterly Regression Results on Observable Analyst Efficiency Using the Single Most Recent Analyst 
Estimate of Earnings 
 
Regression Model: (Quarters 1996.1 through 2001.1)a 
FEit = α1UPit + α2DNit + β1Rit*UPit + β2Rit*DNit + β3FEit-1 + εit 
 
Panel A: Eight-quarter horizon 
 
 MEETb,c NONMEET 
T-testd 
nonmeetmeet ββ =  
UP 0.0004 
(6.14) 
-0.0004 
(-0.95) 
3.11*** 
DN 0.0004 
(6.33) 
0.0002 
(0.64) 
3.17*** 
R*UP 0.0000 
(0.38) 
-0.0000 
(-0.03) 
2.80** 
R*DN 0.0005 
(2.09) 
0.0094 
(2.62) 
3.07*** 
FEt-1 0.4964 
(8.92) 
0.2403 
(3.34) 
2.55** 
 
26 
 
Table 4, Continued 
Panel B: Four-quarter horizonn 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
T-test 
nonmeetmeet ββ =  
UP 0.0005 
(10.75) 
-0.0009 
(-4.95) 
4.49*** 
DN 0.0006 
(9.69) 
-0.0004 
(-1.25) 
2.08** 
R*UP 0.0004 
(2.59) 
-0.0004 
(-0.30) 
3.38*** 
R*DN 0.0003 
(1.43) 
0.0072 
(3.59) 
3.88*** 
FEt-1 0.4136 
(13.15) 
0.1639 
(2.27) 
2.65** 
 
Panel C: Twelve-quarter horizon 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
T-test 
nonmeetmeet ββ =  
UP 0.0002 
(3.70) 
-0.0006 
(-2.08) 
4.00*** 
DN 0.0001 
(1.11) 
-0.0006 
(-2.36) 
2.35** 
R*UP 0.0006 
(1.51) 
-0.0037 
(-1.34) 
4.00*** 
R*DN -0.0013 
(-2.43) 
0.0023 
(1.14) 
4.64*** 
FEt-1 0.7147 
(4.37) 
0.0894 
(1.18) 
2.71** 
 
  
Notes: 
aVariable definitions: 
FEit 
Forecast error for firm i period t,  defined as actual less forecasted earnings per share, 
deflated by beginning of period price.  The earnings forecast is calculated as the median 
of the most recent forecast for each analyst, available within the sixty-day period prior to 
the earnings announcement. 
Rit 
Return for firm i period t, measured from two days after the prior quarter’s earnings 
announcement through the day prior to the first forecast used to calculate the consensus 
earnings forecast, less the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio return. 
UPit 1 if Rit ≥ 0, 0 otherwise 
DNit 1 if Rit < 0, 0 otherwise. 
bFirms are categorized by how many times they meet within the most recent eight, four, and twelve 
quarters, including the current quarter.  NONMEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in no more than half of 
the quarters.  MEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in each of the quarters.   
c Coefficient are reported as the average estimate over 21 cross-sectional quarterly regressions performed 
for each group, MEET and NONMEET. 
dT-tests are reported evaluating the mean difference in absolute value of coefficients. 
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Table 5 
Pooled Regression Results on Observable Analyst Efficiency Using the Single Most 
Recent Analyst Estimate of Earnings 
 
Regression Model: (Quarters 1996.1 through 2001.1)a 
FEit = α1UPit + α2DNit + β1Rit*UPit + β2Rit*DNit + β3FEit-1 + εit 
 
Panel A: Eight-quarter horizon 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
F-test 
nonmeetmeet ββ =  
UP 0.0005 
(2.71) 
-0.0003 
(-2.08) 
0.47 
DN 0.0004 
(1.99) 
-0.0000 
(-0.17) 
2.72* 
R*UP -0.0000 
(-0.06) 
-0.0000 
(-0.03) 
0.00 
R*DN -0.0002 
(-0.21) 
0.0077 
(8.02) 
26.92*** 
FEt-1 0.5719 
(11.33) 
0.0679 
(8.58) 
97.21*** 
 N=5,794 
Adj. R2 = 7.93% 
 
Panel B: Four-quarter horizon 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
F-test 
nonmeetmeet ββ =  
UP 0.0007 
(7.48) 
-0.0008 
(-6.98) 
0.18 
DN 0.0006 
(5.37) 
-0.0005 
(-4.43) 
0.21 
R*UP 0.0003 
(0.95) 
-0.0006 
(-1.27) 
0.18 
R*DN -0.0007 
(-1.30) 
0.0069 
(11.30) 
84.20*** 
FEt-1 0.4284 
(28.06) 
0.0944 
(17.85) 
427.53*** 
 N=15,616 
Adj. R2 = 13.93% 
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Table 5, Continued 
Panel C: Twelve-quarter horizon 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
F-test 
nonmeetmeet ββ =  
UP 0.0005 
(2.13) 
-0.0008 
(-4.67) 
1.07 
DN 0.0005 
(2.01) 
-0.0009 
(-4.84) 
1.37 
R*UP 0.0014 
(1.20) 
-0.0022 
(-2.25) 
5.47** 
R*DN -0.0009 
(-0.63) 
0.0023 
(1.82) 
2.77* 
FEt-1 0.4219 
(10.53) 
0.0222 
(2.05) 
92.70*** 
 N=3,148 
Adj. R2 = 19.32% 
 
  
Notes: 
aVariable definitions: 
FEit 
Forecast error for firm i period t,  defined as actual less forecasted earnings per share, 
deflated by beginning of period price.  The earnings forecast is calculated as the median 
of the most recent forecast for each analyst, available within the sixty-day period prior to 
the earnings announcement. 
Rit 
Return for firm i period t, measured from two days after the prior quarter’s earnings 
announcement through the day prior to the first forecast used to calculate the consensus 
earnings forecast, less the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio return. 
UPit 1 if Rit ≥ 0, 0 otherwise 
DNit 1 if Rit < 0, 0 otherwise. 
bFirms are categorized by how many times they meet within the most recent eight, four, and twelve 
quarters, including the current quarter.  NONMEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in no more than half of 
the quarters.  MEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in each of the quarters.   
c Coefficient estimates are reported for the regression estimated jointly for the MEET and NONMEET 
groups. 
dF-tests are reported comparing the absolute value of the coefficient estimates between MEET and 
NONMEET groups. 
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Summary 
 In general, the results from the estimation of equation 3 appear consistent with 
the hypotheses.  Analysts appear to be relatively less efficient in incorporating the news 
in returns during the period into their forecasts for firms which do not consistently meet 
expectations than for firms that are able to do so.  This appears especially true for 
negative returns news; analysts are consistently overly optimistic with respect to the 
effect of bad news on current period earnings.  While both MEET and NONMEET firms 
analysts appear to underestimate the persistence of forecast errors, this underestimation 
is greater for firms which are able to consistently meet or exceed expectations over time.   
It should be noted that the significance of coefficient estimates on the return 
variables is somewhat dependent on the method of estimation used.  Estimations of 
quarterly coefficients for each subgroup are performed on many fewer observations each 
(typically no more than 200), then averaged over twenty-one separate estimates.  The 
joint estimations contain all observations for both subgroups; while this provides more 
power it also constrains the observable inefficiency to be constant across all quarters.  
Consequently, the significance of a particular result should be evaluated in view of all 
the estimations, rather than a particular table. 
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MARKET INTERPRETATION OF ANALYST FORECAST INEFFICIENCY 
Introduction 
  The prior section investigated differences in analyst forecast efficiency between 
firms that consistently meet or exceed expectations and those that do not.  As mentioned 
previously, inefficient forecasts contribute to market inefficiencies to the extent that 
analyst forecasts proxy for, or are naively incorporated into, market expectations.  
Whether this is the case—whether the market is aware of and corrects for analyst 
forecast inefficiency—is an empirical question.   
Vickers (1999) suggests that market participants are not fooled by an artificial 
earnings strategy, but the SEC has voiced concerns about the prevalence and cost (to 
shareholders) of firm strategizing.  Public remarks reflect the belief that the market 
cannot entirely unwind the artificial strategizing action of firms, implying that the stock 
price rewards given to such firms are unwarranted.12    
 Observable inefficiencies in forecasts imply that forecast errors are predictable.   
In fact, several of the papers referred to earlier have exploited this predictability in order 
to illustrate how analysts’ forecasts can be improved.  Few papers, however, deal with 
investors’ abilities to distinguish between the predictable and surprise components of 
those errors, though several (e.g. Bernard and Thomas [1989]; Lys and Sohn [1990]) 
have addressed investors’ abilities to distinguish between the predictable and surprise 
components of earnings calculated from a time-series model.  Because analysts 
                                                 
12 Kasznik and McNichols (2002) relate current period meet/beat behavior to the relative performance of 
earnings in future periods.  Results from their study could speak to the impact of an artificial earnings 
strategy on the market, however their metric of performance is the measure which can be manipulated.  To 
my knowledge, no other study has assessed the relation between MEET status and long-term future 
performance. I address this again in the final section on future research. 
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ostensibly have more timely information than a time-series, the market may look more to 
them for guidance when forming its own expectations.  For example, Abarbanell and 
Bernard (1992) find that analyst inefficiency accounts for a portion of the observed post-
earnings announcement drift.   
Given the apparent importance of analyst forecasts as a benchmark (Degeorge, 
Patel, and Zeckhauser [1999]), coupled with managers’ varied motivations and the 
recent importance placed on such motivations by governing authorities, it is important to 
determine to what extent the market is aware of forecast predictability.  If such 
awareness exists, governing bodies can have more confidence that the market is not 
necessarily fooled by an earnings strategy based on forecast errors (i.e. that investors do 
not naively adopt analysts’ expectations as their own). 
Efficiency and earnings response coefficients 
The error term from equation (3) can be interpreted as a proxy for earnings 
announcement news after controlling for the inefficiencies in analyst forecasts.  By 
comparing a regression of cumulative abnormal returns on aggregate forecast error to 
one incorporating a distinction between the informative (residual) and predictable 
components, we may gain insight into the relative importance the market places on each 
piece of information.  If the response coefficients are substantially the same, it suggests 
that the market cannot effectively distinguish between predictable and surprise 
components of earnings.13  On the other hand, if the response coefficient on the 
efficiency-controlled news component is significantly greater than that on the 
                                                 
13 To the extent that the entire predictable component of earnings has not been eliminated from the 
FEit|EFFit measure, however, the power of any comparison will be reduced. 
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predictable component, the market, at least to some degree, understands that forecast 
errors are predictable.  Similarly, if the market does distinguish between the two 
components of forecast error, the model fit should improve.14 
 To test this, I perform a cross-sectional event study for a given quarter, 
regressing the announcement window cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on proxies for 
news at the earnings announcement date.  Equation (4) utilizes residual forecast error 
after controlling for observable analyst inefficiency. 
CARit = γ0 + γ1FEHATit + γ2FEit|EFFit + ηit       (4) 
where 
CARit = cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return measured over the three 
day window centered on the earnings announcement date, 
FEit = realized forecast error, defined as actual less forecasted earnings, 
deflated by beginning of period price, 
FEHATit = amount of forecast error that is predictable based on observable analyst 
inefficiency, and 
FEit|EFFit = residual forecast error after controlling for the observed level of 
analyst forecast efficiency. 
 
Since FEHATit  is predictable based on observable analyst inefficiency, that 
portion of total error should not come as a surprise to the market and, consequently, 
should not be related to the market reaction at the earnings announcement date.  If γ2 > 
γ1 it suggests that the market takes analyst inefficiency into account when forming their 
earnings expectations.  If the two coefficients are substantially the same, however, it 
suggests that the market may not fully understand the predictability in forecast errors 
stemming from analyst inefficiency. 
                                                 
14 These tests are similar in spirit to those studies which split total earnings into cash flow and accrual 
components. 
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12:3 γγ >H  
As in Cornell and Landsman (1989), it is possible that, along with the earnings 
announcement, managers release information regarding their expectations for the next 
quarter.15  In such situations, it is important to control for any market reaction to this 
new information in order to properly evaluate the reaction to the current earnings 
announcement.  Consequently, I include two control variables related to analysts’ period 
ahead forecast revisions around the earnings announcement date. 
The revision variable, REV, is measured as the change in forecasted earnings.  
That is, REV is equal to PRE_FOR – POST_FOR, where PRE_FOR is the single analyst 
forecast for period t+2 closest to, and preceding, the earnings announcement date for 
period t+1, and POST_FOR is the single analyst forecast for period t+2 closest to, and 
following, the earnings announcement date for period t+1.  In order to measure REV for 
as many firm-quarters as possible, the forecast revision need not occur within the three-
day earnings announcement window used to measure CARi,t+1.  As a result, the revision 
window encompasses a greater span of time over which information may enter the 
market.  To control for any information that may be contained in REV but be unrelated 
to the earnings announcement window, I include a control variable that measures the 
return over the revision window, exclusive of the return over the three-day 
announcement period.  REVRET is measured as the market-adjusted cumulative return 
from PRE_FOR through POST_FOR, less the market-adjusted three-day announcement 
period return.  The estimated form of the equation follows: 
                                                 
15 Recent examples include Home Depot and Dell, both of which gave fourth quarter earnings warnings at 
the time they announced third quarter earnings for 2002. 
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CARit+1 = γ0 + γ1FEHATit+1 + γ2FEit+1|EFFit+1 + γ3REVit+2 + γ4REVRETit+1 + ηit+1    (5)
  
Results  
Table 6 reports results from the quarterly estimation by subgroup of equation 5.  
For the four and eight quarter horizons the predictable component of forecast error is not 
significantly related to the earnings announcement window return, CAR, while the 
surprise component of forecast error is significantly positive.  T-tests of mean difference 
between these coefficient estimates confirm that the coefficient on the surprise 
component is significantly greater than the coefficient on the predictable component, 
consistent with hypothesis 4 and the notion of market efficiency.  That is, when reacting 
to the earnings announcement, the market does not appear to fixate on the entire error; 
rather, they react to the portion of the error that is not predictable based on observable 
forecast efficiency.  For the twelve quarter horizon, this does not appear to be the case; 
however further investigation reveals that there are far fewer observations per quarter for 
this horizon, particularly for the MEET subsample restricting the ability to form 
consistent coefficient estimates. 
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Table 6 
Quarterly Regression Results on the Market Response to the Predictable and Surprise 
Components of Analyst Consensus Forecast Error 
 
Regression Model: (Quarters 1996.1 through 2001.1)a 
CARit+1 = γ0 + γ1FEHATit+1 + γ2FEit+1|EFFit+1 + γ3REVit+2 + γ4REVRETit+1 + ηit+1 
      
Panel A: Eight quarter horizon 
 
 MEETb,c NONMEET 
Intercept 0.008 (3.13) 
-0.000 
(-0.14) 
FEHAT -1.658 (-0.90) 
-0.795 
(-0.84) 
FE|EFF 4.353 (5.31) 
1.142 
(3.97) 
REV -2.987 (-3.62) 
-0.887 
(-3.93) 
REVRET -0.050 (-2.31) 
-0.033 
(-2.18) 
T-testd 
21 γγ =  3.08
*** 2.14** 
 
Panel B: Four  quarter horizon 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
Intercept 0.008 (4.59) 
-0.000 
(-0.11) 
FEHAT -0.422 (-0.61) 
0.024 
(0.03) 
FE|EFF 3.012 (7.45) 
0.947 
(3.77) 
REV -1.984 (-5.13) 
-0.660 
(-4.51) 
REVRET -0.050 (-4.58) 
-0.034 
(-3.05) 
T-test 
21 γγ =  5.06
*** 1.07 
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Table 6, Continued 
Panel C: Twelve  quarter horizon 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
Intercept 0.004 (0.52) 
-0.002 
(-0.94) 
FEHAT 9.554 (0.46) 
1.464 
(0.72) 
FE|EFF 4.238 (1.61) 
1.755 
(2.77) 
REV -21.009 (-1.21) 
-0.975 
(-2.33) 
REVRET -0.198 (-1.31) 
-0.022 
(-1.09) 
T-test 
21 γγ =  0.13
 0.15 
 
 
Notes: 
aVariable definitions: 
CARit+1 
cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return measured over the three day window 
centered on the earnings announcement date, 
FEit+1 
Forecast error for firm i period t,  defined as actual less forecasted earnings per share, 
deflated by beginning of period price.  The earnings forecast is calculated as the 
median of the most recent forecast for each analyst, available within the sixty-day 
period prior to the earnings announcement. 
FEHATit+! 
Amount of forecast error that is predictable based on observable analyst inefficiency 
(fitted value for period t+1 using predicted coefficients from equation 3 estimated at 
time t), and 
FEit+1|EFFit+1 
Residual forecast error after controlling for the observed level of analyst forecast 
efficiency (FEit+1 – FEHATit+1). 
bFirms are categorized by how many times they meet analyst forecast estimates within the most recent 
eight, four, and twelve quarters, ending the prior quarter.  NONMEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in 
no more than half of the quarters.  MEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in each of the quarters.   
c Coefficient are reported as the average estimate over 21 cross-sectional quarterly regressions performed 
for each group, MEET and NONMEET. 
dT-tests are reported evaluating the mean difference in value of coefficients. 
 
 
  
37 
 
  Turning to Table 7, then, we see the results for the joint estimation of the 
coefficients for the MEET and NONMEET groups across all quarters.  Here, the results 
are not as consistently clear with respect to market efficiency.  At the eight quarter 
horizon (Panel A), results are generally consistent with those found performing quarterly 
coefficient estimations by group.  The estimated coefficient for the surprise component 
of forecast error is significantly larger than that for the predictable component of error, 
though in this case the predictable component for NONMEET firms is significant on it’s 
own.  In the four quarter horizon, the surprise coefficient is significantly greater than the 
predictable one for MEET firms. For NONMEET firms, however, we fail to reject the 
null that the coefficient estimates are the same, though only the coefficient on the 
surprise component of error is significantly different from zero.  As in Table 6, at the 
twelve quarter horizon we again fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on 
the predictable and surprise components of error are the same for both MEET and 
NONMEET firms.  For MEET firms both coefficients are significant, suggesting that for 
firms with a longer history of meeting or exceeding expectations the market is less able 
to distinguish the true surprise within realized forecast errors.  An alternative explanation 
is that for firms with a MEET pattern, the entire current error is an informative signal.  
For NONMEET firms, neither coefficient is significant, suggesting, perhaps, that for 
firms without a clear historical pattern, the revision of next quarter’s expectations is 
more informative than the current error itself. 
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Table 7 
Pooled Regression Results on the Market Response to the Predictable and Surprise 
Components of Analyst Consensus Forecast Error 
 
Regression Model: (Quarters 1996.1 through 2001.1)a 
CARit+1 = γ0 + γ1FEHATit+1 + γ2FEit+1|EFFit+1 + γ3REVit+2 + γ4REVRETit+1 + ηit+1 
  
Panel A: Eight quarter horizon 
 
 MEETb,c NONMEET 
Intercept 0.005 (4.38) 
0.002 
(1.64) 
FEHAT 0.566 (0.94) 
0.559 
(3.09) 
FE|EFF 1.870 (6.60) 
0.903 
(8.39) 
REV -1.368 (-5.17) 
-0.698 
(-6.23) 
REVRET -0.028 (-2.59) 
-0.022 
(-2.16) 
F-testd 
21 γγ =  5.09
** 4.53** 
 N=5,820 Adj. R2 = 3.28% 
 
Panel B: Four  quarter horizon 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
Intercept 0.005 (6.54) 
0.001 
(0.76) 
FEHAT 0.542 (1.76) 
0.214 
(1.54) 
FE|EFF 1.733 (10.77) 
0.325 
(6.77) 
REV -0.849 (-6.44) 
-0.691 
(-8.96) 
REVRET -0.028 (-4.72) 
-0.026 
(-3.85) 
F-test 
21 γγ =  16.91
*** 0.58 
 N=14,249 Adj. R2 = 2.54% 
 
39 
 
 
Table 7, Continued 
Panel C: Twelve  quarter horizon 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
Intercept 0.003 (1.72) 
0.000 
(0.58) 
FEHAT 4.276 (2.17) 
0.019 
(0.07) 
FE|EFF 6.177 (6.10) 
0.094 
(1.51) 
REV -0.250 (-0.94) 
-0.699 
(-4.30) 
REVRET -0.046 (-2.58) 
-0.010 
(-0.74) 
F-test 
21 γγ =  0.99
 0.09 
 N=2,889 Adj. R2 = 2.24% 
 
 
Notes: 
aVariable definitions: 
CARit+1 
cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return measured over the three day window 
centered on the earnings announcement date, 
FEit+1 
Forecast error for firm i period t,  defined as actual less forecasted earnings per share, 
deflated by beginning of period price.  The earnings forecast is calculated as the 
median of the most recent forecast for each analyst, available within the sixty-day 
period prior to the earnings announcement. 
FEHATit+! 
Amount of forecast error that is predictable based on observable analyst inefficiency 
(fitted value for period t+1 using predicted coefficients from equation 3 estimated at 
time t), and 
FEit+1|EFFit+1 
Residual forecast error after controlling for the observed level of analyst forecast 
efficiency (FEit+1 – FEHATit+1). 
bFirms are categorized by how many times they meet analyst forecast estimates within the most recent 
eight, four, and twelve quarters, ending the prior quarter.  NONMEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in 
no more than half of the quarters.  MEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in each of the quarters.   
c Coefficient are reported as the average estimate over 21 cross-sectional quarterly regressions performed 
for each group, MEET and NONMEET. 
dF-tests are reported evaluating the difference in value of coefficients. 
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It is possible, however, that the degree of analyst inefficiency with respect to 
publicly available information, and hence the estimated coefficients, is not constant from 
one quarter to another.  Since analysis of the results from estimating equation 3 suggest 
that analysts are, at least in some cases, inefficient with respect to certain information, I 
also estimate a regression of CAR on total current period forecast error, as well as the 
information variables from equation 3.  Since the prior analysis suggests that the total 
forecast error is related to these information variables, including them in a regression of 
CAR on forecast error should control for the noise in forecast error without restricting 
the coefficient estimates to be the same from quarter to quarter.  If the market considers 
analyst inefficiency in setting their expectations, the pattern of significance on the 
coefficient estimates of this expanded regression should mirror that of the earlier 
analysis, though the magnitudes may change. 
 Tables 8 and 9 contains this analysis, quarterly and joint respectively, for each 
horizon.   The results are not generally consistent with the market controlling for 
variables for which analysts are observably inefficient in the prior period.  That is, at the 
earnings announcement date the market appears to primarily react to current period 
error, generally controlling only for the prior period error.  The market does not appear 
to control for returns-based information, though prior analysis shows that, in some cases, 
analysts are observably inefficient with respect to this information when forming their 
forecasts.  The possible exception is the twelve quarter horizon.  Again, the number of 
observations within a quarter are much smaller for this horizon for the MEET 
subsample, restricting our ability to estimate stable coefficients across quarters.  For the 
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joint estimation, however, the market does appear to control for publicly available bad 
news when evaluating current period error. 
Summary 
 The evidence is mixed regarding whether the market appropriately controls for 
analyst inefficiency.  Though earlier analysis indicates analysts are to some degree 
inefficient with respect to both period returns and prior period errors, the market 
response to current period forecast error does not appear to reliably distinguish between 
the resulting predictable and surprise components of earnings.  There is some evidence, 
however, that they are able to make this distinction when the pattern of forecast errors, 
or lack thereof, is less established. 
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Table 8 
Quarterly Estimation of Market Response to Analyst Consensus Forecast Error Controlling for Prior 
Information 
 
Regression Model: (Quarters 1996.1 through 2001.1)a 
CARit+1 = α1UPit+1 + α2DNit+1 + β1FEit+1 + β2Rit*UPit+1 + β3Rit*DNit+1 + β4FEit + γ3REVit+2 + 
γ4REVRETit+1  + εit      
 
Panel A: Eight quarter horizon 
 
 MEETb,c NONMEET 
UP 0.006 (1.72)* 
0.004 
(1.03) 
DN 0.005 (1.33) 
0.002 
(0.75) 
FEt+1 
4.495 
(4.56)*** 
1.167 
(3.75)*** 
R*UP 0.004 (0.18) 
-0.030 
(-1.01) 
R*DN -0.019 (-0.55) 
-0.021 
(-0.68) 
FEt 
-2.793 
(-2.29)*** 
-0.269 
(-1.57) 
REV -2.824 (-3.83)*** 
-0.970 
(-4.31)*** 
REVRET -0.059 (-2.47)** 
-0.034 
(-2.40)** 
 
Panel B: Four quarter horizon 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
UP 0.005 (2.44)** 
0.003 
(1.24) 
DN 0.007 (2.57)** 
0.002 
(0.63) 
FEt+1 
2.818 
(7.70)*** 
0.902 
(3.67)*** 
R*UP 0.001 (0.16) 
-0.015 
(-0.76) 
R*DN -0.006 (-0.28) 
0.030 
(1.46) 
FEt 
-1.618 
(-4.02)*** 
-0.650 
(-4.24)*** 
REV -2.217 (-5.38)*** 
-0.650 
(-4.24)*** 
REVRET -0.054 (-5.03)*** 
-0.038 
(-3.81)*** 
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Table 8, Continued 
Panel C: Twelve quarter horizon 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
UP -0.129 (0.95) 
0.000 
(0.18) 
DN 0.011 (0.97) 
-0.010 
(-1.34) 
FEt+1 
61.827 
(1.02) 
2.598 
(3.25)*** 
R*UP 0.732 (1.07) 
-0.028 
(-0.68) 
R*DN 0.193 (0.68) 
-0.169 
(-1.59) 
FEt 
164.93 
(0.97) 
-0.075 
(-0.15) 
REV 110.217 (0.97) 
-1.458 
(-2.26)** 
REVRET -0.043 (-1.76)* 
-0.059 
(-1.27) 
 
 
Notes: 
aVariable definitions: 
FEit+1 
Forecast error for firm i period t+1,  defined as actual less forecasted earnings per share, 
deflated by beginning of period price.  The earnings forecast is calculated as the median 
of the most recent forecast for each analyst, available within the sixty-day period prior to 
the earnings announcement. 
Rit+1 
Return for firm i period t+1, measured from two days after the prior quarter’s earnings 
announcement through the day prior to the earnings forecast, less the CRSP value-
weighted market portfolio return. 
UPit+1 1 if Rit ≥ 0, 0 otherwise 
DNit+1 1 if Rit < 0, 0 otherwise. 
CARit+1 
cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return measured over the three day window 
centered on the earnings announcement date, 
bFirms are categorized by how many times they meet analyst forecast estimates within the most recent 
eight, four, and twelve quarters, ending the prior quarter.  NONMEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in 
no more than half of the quarters.  MEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in each of the quarters.   
c Coefficient are reported as the average estimate over 21 cross-sectional quarterly regressions performed 
for each group, MEET and NONMEET. 
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Table 9 
Pooled Estimation of Market Response to Analyst Consensus Forecast Error Controlling for Prior 
Information 
 
Regression Model: (Quarters 1996.1 through 2001.1)a 
CARit+1 = α1UPit+1 + α2DNit+1 + β1FEit+1 + β2Rit*UPit+1 + β3Rit*DNit+1 + β4FEit + γ3REVit+2 + 
γ4REVRETit+1  + εit      
 
Panel A: Eight quarter horizon 
 
 MEETb,c NONMEET 
UP 0.005 (2.53)** 
0.004 
(1.71)* 
DN 0.005 (1.97)* 
0.003 
(1.20) 
FEt+1 
1.901 
(6.62)*** 
0.914 
(8.42)*** 
R*UP -0.000 (-0.01) 
-0.027 
(-1.92)* 
R*DN -0.005 (-0.28) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
FEt 
-0.976 
(-2.31)** 
-0.123 
(-1.77)* 
REV -1.374 (-5.16)*** 
-0.633 
(-5.73)*** 
REVRET -0.026 (-2.38)** 
-0.019 
(-1.82)* 
 N=5,819 Adj. R2 = 3.18% 
 
Panel B: Four quarter horizon 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
UP 0.005 (3.65)*** 
0.002 
(1.27) 
DN 0.004 (2.79)*** 
0.003 
(1.38) 
FEt+1 
1.738 
(10.84)*** 
0.310 
(6.63)*** 
R*UP -0.004 (-0.56) 
-0.007 
(-0.75) 
R*DN -0.010 (-1.03) 
0.019 
(1.59) 
FEt 
-0.729 
(-4.25)*** 
-0.009 
(-0.17) 
REV -0.835 (-6.29)*** 
-0.666 
(-8.73)*** 
REVRET -0.031 (-5.19)*** 
-0.025 
(-3.69)*** 
 N=14,243 Adj. R2 = 2.53% 
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Table 9, Continued 
Panel C: Twelve quarter horizon 
 
 MEET NONMEET 
UP 0.006 (1.74)* 
0.000 
(0.35) 
DN -0.003 (-0.89) 
0.004 
(1.23) 
FEt+1 
5.629 
(5.31)*** 
0.084 
(1.33) 
R*UP -0.018 (-0.77) 
0.009 
(0.59) 
R*DN -0.073 (-2.60)*** 
0.039 
(1.78)* 
FEt 
-2.358 
(-1.77)* 
-0.097 
(-1.25) 
REV -0.218 (-0.82) 
-0.687 
(-4.53)*** 
REVRET -0.047 (-2.60)*** 
-0.013 
(-0.95) 
 N=2,887 Adj. R2 = 2.17% 
 
 
Notes: 
aVariable definitions: 
FEit+1 
Forecast error for firm i period t+1,  defined as actual less forecasted earnings per share, 
deflated by beginning of period price.  The earnings forecast is calculated as the median 
of the most recent forecast for each analyst, available within the sixty-day period prior to 
the earnings announcement. 
Rit+1 
Return for firm i period t+1, measured from two days after the prior quarter’s earnings 
announcement through the day prior to the earnings forecast, less the CRSP value-
weighted market portfolio return. 
UPit+1 1 if Rit ≥ 0, 0 otherwise 
DNit+1 1 if Rit < 0, 0 otherwise. 
CARit+1 
cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return measured over the three day window 
centered on the earnings announcement date, 
bFirms are categorized by how many times they meet analyst forecast estimates within the most recent 
eight, four, and twelve quarters, ending the prior quarter.  NONMEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in 
no more than half of the quarters.  MEET firms meet or exceed forecasts in each of the quarters.   
c Coefficient are reported as the average estimate over 21 cross-sectional quarterly regressions performed 
for each group, MEET and NONMEET. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, I first test whether analyst forecast errors are significantly 
related to information that is publicly available at the time the forecasts are made.  
Evidence suggests that analysts are relatively less efficient at incorporating news, 
especially bad news, into their earnings forecasts for those firms which do not 
consistently meet or exceed expectations (i.e. those firms who meet or exceed 
expectations in half or fewer of the quarters within a historical horizon window).  At the 
same time, forecast errors are significantly more persistent for firms with a historical 
pattern of meeting or exceeding expectations.  It is not clear whether the market 
distinguishes between the resulting predictable and surprise components of realized 
forecast errors.  While market participants may do so successfully when a pattern of 
forecast errors is less established, “seeing through” the forecast error may become more 
difficult over time.  An alternative explanation, however, is the possibility that the nature 
of the information in current period forecast errors changes as firms are more clearly 
established as MEET or NONMEET firms. 
Given the above possibility that the market may not “correctly” control for 
analyst inefficiency when setting its expectations of earnings, an extension of the current 
work could examine whether an investor could earn abnormal returns by formulating a 
trading strategy based on the true surprise contained in realized forecast error. 
Kasznik and McNichols (2002) are the first to question whether, “artificial” 
strategy or not, the rewards observed to meeting expectations are rational.  That is, do 
MEET firms have better future performance?  Indeed, evidence in Chevis, Das, and 
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Sivaramakrishnan (2002a) suggests that the market perceives MEET firms to have better 
future growth opportunities.  If a MEET strategy is a costly and credible signal of future 
performance, perhaps it is not as bad as it is portrayed, even if “accounting devices” such 
as earnings and expectations management are used to achieve it.  The future 
performance metric Kasznik and McNichols (2002) use, however, is earnings, the very 
item that may be manipulated in order to achieve the strategy.  A contemporaneous study 
proposes the use of a variety of metrics to evaluate the long-run future performance of 
MEET firms, including abnormal returns, the P/E ratio, asset growth, cash flows, and the 
B/M ratio.  Such tests will further our understanding of the validity of the signal 
management is likely trying to convey by following a meet/beat strategy. 
The results in Bonner, Walther, and Young (2001) suggest that the relative level 
of investor sophistication could play an important role in the analyses outlined in the 
preceding sections.  It is possible that sophisticated investors are more adept at analyzing 
and correcting for analyst forecast inefficiencies.  An extension of the current study 
could include a proxy for investor sophistication as an additional control variable. 
Finally, this scenario is replayed in many markets around the world.  Those 
markets, however, have different properties from the one in the United States.  Analysts 
have an “information revelation” role here but may perform another function in a 
different economic setting.  The U.S. could benefit from learning whether those markets 
have a better ability to “see through” managerial manipulations in these other contexts.  
Chevis (2002) is a first step in that direction. 
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